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Information Uncertainty in Human Rights Crisis Research
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Introduction
Human rights researchers pin much hope on the use of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) to strengthen the quality of their research. Increased trainings,1 funding,2 and
hiring of specialized staff are all signs of the high expectations that technology will positively
impact, if not provide an easy fix, to current human rights problems. However, in order to realize
the actual potential of ICTs, it is important to conceptualize clearer their added value, and to go
beyond wishful assumptions: A single app or interactive map will hardly catch a war criminal,3
and ICTs are no panacea for atrocity detection or response.
ICTs by themselves do not deliver complete truth—let alone provide a shortcut to justice—as
they largely capture a limited scope of information. Instead, they add very specific details and
insights to research. Their significant added value in mass atrocities research thus arises from their
ability to reduce information uncertainty. A 2015 UN report on ICTs and human rights, specifically
in regards to the right to life, pointedly captures the challenge ICTs can help to address:
(…) the work relating to protecting this right [to life] often concerns disputed facts or even the
availability of facts. Individuals commit violations of the right to life not because they believe
it is justifiable, but because they believe they will not be called on to justify themselves. That
places a premium on fact-finding and evidence.4

Uncertainty can best be described as the inability to assign probabilities. Information
uncertainty in a human rights documentation context, as stated in the quote above, encompasses two
related challenges: information scarcity and the unknown quality of available information. While
these are not new challenges in human rights research, the latter is exacerbated in the digital age.
This article describes how ICTs reduce information uncertainty during human rights crises,
which, by definition, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and the commission of
atrocity crimes. The author will showcase how ICTs are integrated into human rights crisis research
to detect and document mass atrocities, i.e. crimes under international law such as war crimes,
crimes against humanity, or genocide. It is written from a practitioner’s perspective, drawing from
the work of a global human rights watchdog, thus avoiding the trap of inferring conclusions from
a single region or a specific tool. Having said that, since ICTs describe a wide range of technologies
that enable the electronic collection, transmission, presentation or storage of data, this article
focuses on two specific types of ICTs that are used to address information uncertainty: geospatial
and mobile phone technologies.
Crisis, Uncertainty and the “Lemon Problem”
Information uncertainty is especially high during times of crisis. Common traits of human rights
crises are condensed in the following table:
1

See, for example, “Remote Sensing for Humanitarian Programs Workshops,” Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, accessed
July 20, 2016, http://hhi.harvard.edu/education/workshops/remote-sensing.

2

See, for example, “The Tech Challenge for Atrocity Prevention,” Humanity United, accessed July 20, 2016, http://
thetechchallenge.org/blog/.

3

Owen Bowcott, “eyeWitness to Atrocities: The App Aimed at Bringing War Criminals to Justice,” The Guardian, June 7,
2015, accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/08/eyewitness-to-atrocities-the-appaimed-at-bringing-war-criminals-to-justice; Christoph Koettl, “#DemandJustice: The Website War Criminals Don’t
Want You To Share,” July 19, 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, http://blog.amnestyusa.org/africa/demandjustice-thewebsite-war-criminals-dont-want-you-to-share/.

4

United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns: Use of
information and communications technologies to secure the right to life, April 24, 2015 (A/HRC/29/37), 5-6. Highlighting by
author.

Christoph Koettl, “Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce Information Uncertainty in Human Rights
Crisis Research” Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 1 (2017): 36-54. ©2016 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1440
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Table 1. Common traits of human rights crises.
A cross-cutting attribute across these issues is the presence of serious, often widespread,
human rights violations. Crisis situations are prone to the commission of atrocity crimes, resulting
from perpetrator expectations that their crimes will go unnoticed or can be easily dismissed or
minimized5 in an environment of high information uncertainty.
5

Scott Edwards, “Fieldwork from the Sky: Remote Data Collection from War Zones,” International Sudan Studies
Association 2009 annual conference in Pretoria (2009), South Africa, 1-3.
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The Lemon Problem
The combination of the characteristics listed in Table 1 create what can be referred to as the “lemon
problem”—the risk of using misinformation that can discredit an entire research project. While this
is an old challenge, it has been exacerbated in the digital age, where the spread of misinformation
is made easier by digital social media networks.6
The lemon analogy is borrowed from economics. The term lemon is used in the United States
to describe a defective car, and was used by Nobel Prize winning economist George Akerlof
to analyze quality uncertainty, using the example of a car buyer who faces the risk of buying a
bad car7 (whereas a used-car dealer represents an institution that reduces quality uncertainty).
International theorist Robert Keohane used this analysis to explain the creation of institutions in
international affairs.8
Both of these concepts prove useful in assessing the value of ICTs for human rights crisis
research. In this context, a lemon describes a piece of misinformation—or bad information—that
creates the danger of discrediting the accuracy of research. Accuracy has always been at the core of
human rights fact-finding, as standard works on this topic emphasize:
For NGOs, the stakes in surviving (…) scrutiny could not be higher. The credibility of their
fact-finding is their stock-in-trade. Broadly stated, the chief objective of human rights NGOs
is to promote compliance with international human rights standards. (…) Fact-finding lies at
the heart of these efforts, and the fact-finding ‘works’ when it convinces the target audience
that the published allegations are well founded.9

The opportunities for human rights documentation stemming from the omnipresence of
digital sensors are undeniable. Investigations by both intergovernmental10 and non-governmental11
human rights monitoring groups increasingly rely on video or photographic evidence. However,
the rise of ICTs and citizen media leads to an exponentially growing lemon problem. With lower

6

For a recent study on the online misinformation ecosystem see Craig Silverman, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Viral Content.
How news websites spread (and debunk) online rumors, unverified claims, and misinformation,” Tow Center for
Digital Journalism, February 10, 2015. As the author states on page 35: “There is a growing online misinformation
ecosystem that churns out false information at an increasing pace. Its success often depends on two factors: the ability
to cause sharing cascades on social networks and the ability to get online media to assist in the propagation, thereby
adding a layer of credibility that further increases traffic and sharing.”

7

George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 84, 3 (Aug 1970), 488-500.

8

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984). See also a 2004 interview with Keohane: “Akerlof showed how in an economic market, the
used-car market, there could be market failure. That is, the lack of institutions could create a situation where prices
didn’t clear. A buyer was not able to buy a car from a seller for a mutually agreed price which would have been good
for them both, because there were no institutions, there was nobody to make credible promises unless you have this
institution of the used-car dealer. I saw immediately that the used-car dealer was very much like the international
institution, which would increase the credibility, the promises, reduce uncertainty, and reduce the cost of
transactions, and, therefore, this was the key to thinking about the role of international institutions.” “Robert Keohane
Interview: Conversations with History”, Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley, March 9,
2004, accessed July 27, 2016, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Keohane/keohane-con2.html.

9

Diane Orentlicher, “Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-finding,” Harvard Human Rights Journal
3 (1990), 92-93.

10

On the use of information and communications technologies by human rights mechanisms, see United Nations, “Report
of the Special Rapporteur”, 17-19. For a specific example, see also: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, United Nations, Technical Note prepared by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Mr. Philip Alston, in relation to the authenticity of the “Channel 4 videotape,” January 7, 2010, accessed July 27, 2016, http://
groundviews.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/un_technical_note.pdf?x98647.

11

See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Execution Video Shows Need for International Inquiry,” August
26, 2009, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/26/sri-lanka-execution-video-shows-needinternational-inquiry; Amnesty International, “‘Shocking’ Video Shows Armed Group Carrying Out Summary
Killings of Men in Syria’s Idlib Province, Says Amnesty International,” November 1, 2012, accessed July 25, 2016,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/shocking-video-shows-armed-group-carrying-out-summarykillings-of-men-in-syria-s-idlib-province-says.
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barriers to self-publishing and re-sharing digital content instantly and globally, the spread of
misinformation increases. The lack of institutions that provide quality control—such as traditional
media outlets before the advent of digital social networks—contribute to this challenge, which only
recently came under scrutiny through the fake news debate following the 2016 U.S. presidential
elections. The human rights profession is not immune to this problem, and examples of human
rights related lemons are plentiful:
•
•

•
•
•

In a since removed tweet, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Ken Roth used a drone
video from the destruction in Gaza in the aftermath of the 2014 conflict to describe the
impact of barrel bombs on Aleppo.
In the first half of 2016, images from the conflict in north-east Nigeria were repeatedly
used to support claims of mass atrocities in other countries. The same images were then
used in the context of extrajudicial executions in Burundi, and the crisis in South Sudan
starting in June 2016.12
A video showing extreme violence, likely stemming from Kenya, is repeatedly circulated
online. The highly graphic video was used to describe post-election violence in Cote
D’Ivoire,13 in addition to describing violations in the context of South Sudan and Burma.
The BBC used an image from Iraq in 2003 for a story on the Houla massacre in Syria in
May 2012.14
In the last week of May 2016, a video of a killing was posted, reportedly related to the
Fallujah Offensive that started in late May.15 However, a second video16 of the same
incident was already shared in mid-April 2016. The incident was thus old and not related
to this specific military operation.

This list is a non-comprehensive sample. Global human rights groups are faced with such
digital misinformation on a weekly basis. There is another cost of the lemon problem, in addition to
the high risk of inaccuracy. It forces human rights researchers to treat every piece of digital content
with extreme caution, and creates high opportunity costs to review and assess a video or image.
There is no silver bullet to detect lemons, and the verification process of a single piece of digital
content can easily take up an entire day.17 Consequently, a lot of content is either ignored (the triage
problem) or added on only as an afterthought, once enough traditional research is gathered.
Corporate institutions emerged over the last years to fill the void in quality control, the
most prominent being Storyful, the self-described world’s first “news agency (...) for the social
media age.”18 However, with its focus on viral and newsworthy content and its cost-prohibitive
subscription, this is not a suitable option for human rights groups, thus leaving it to individual
researchers themselves to verify information. Both large news organizations and human rights
organizations started to set up internal institutions to provide quality control, such as the BBC’s

12

Andrea Spada, Twitter Post, March 1, 2016, 6:43a.m, https://twitter.com/Baldoriano/status/704633182063370240.
[Warning: Graphic Content]

13

Julien Pain, “Beware of Internet Misinformation: Hoax Footage of Atrocities in Ivory Coast,” France 24, July 4, 2011,
accessed July 27, 2016, http://observers.france24.com/en/20110407-beware-internet-misinformation-hoax-footageatrocities-ivory-coast.

14

Chris Hamilton, “Houla Massacre Picture Mistake,” BBC, May 29 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
blogs/theeditors/2012/05/houla_massacre_picture_mistake.html.

15

Video originally posted on Twitter https://twitter.com/irakiRevolution/status/736240104155586561. Account has been
deleted.

16

Twitter Post, April 22, 2016, 10:27p.m. https://twitter.com/D_yassir_1/status/723699727146057728. [Warning: Graphic
Content]

17

Christoph Koettl, “Citizen Media Research and Verification: An Analytical Framework for Human Rights Practitioners,”
(Human Rights in the Digital Age: CGHR Practitioner Paper 1, Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Centre of
Governance and Human Rights), January 2016, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.cghr.polis.cam.ac.uk/publications/
cghr-practitioner-papers-series/paper-1.

18

Mark Little, “The Human Algorithm,” May 20, 2011, accessed July 27, 2016, http://blog.storyful.com/2011/05/20/thehuman-algorithm-2.
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user-generated content hub,19 or Amnesty International’s Tactical Research and Analysis Team.20
An interesting trend to follow will be the creation of collaborative and volunteer networks to
address the lemon problem, such as Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps,21 which is
tasked “to find content in social media streams and to verify videos and photographs to help (…)
researchers monitor and report on human rights violations.”22 Journalism schools started to offer
graduate program in so-called Social Journalism that include coursework on verification,23 and the
human rights field might follow suit.
A technical solution to address the lemon problem is documentation apps that capture relevant
metadata and chain of custody records. These have the potential to be impactful on specific issues
and when working with dedicated networks—as Karen Naimer, Widney Brown, and Ranit Mishori
write in their article published in this special issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention—but are less
likely to be adapted by large numbers of people or utilized by bystanders.24
Applications in Human Rights Crisis Research
ICTs can help address the challenges faced during crises as listed in Table 1. Geospatial technologies
and camera enabled cell phones have proven the most useful in human rights crisis research, as
they can be used to circumvent access restrictions to collect and transfer potential evidence.
Geospatial technologies, most notably satellite imagery, are some of the most impactful tools
to circumvent access restrictions and address the information scarcity problem. As one of the
case studies below will detail, satellite imagery enables human rights fact-finding in inaccessible
areas such as North Korea. While satellite images are limited regarding the human rights issues
they can document, this technology has proven successful to document a range of violations,
including violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ESCR). It is important to note that space-based remote sensing allows for the
detection of both spatial and temporal trends. Vast archives of satellite imagery give researchers
access to historical records, which can be highly relevant in the documentation of atrocity crimes.
Relevant features to assess include: civilian, military or humanitarian infrastructure, and if and
how they have changed over time.25 Further, satellite sensors collect data across the infrared,
visible, and ultraviolet wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum. This has ramifications for
human rights researchers, as it allows going beyond simple visual analysis (e.g. housing demolitions
or other infrastructure demolitions) to more advanced analysis, such as detecting petrochemical
releases26 or thermal anomalies.27 Remote sensing technologies will gain in importance
over the coming years, as more commercial actors enter the sub-meter resolution market, including
micro-satellite companies, and entry barriers to using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) get
lower.
19

Sally Taft, “How Did You Help Us Change the Way We Report the News?” December 27, 2014, accessed July 28, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-30421631.

20

See the informal blog of the team, “Lemming Cliff - View from the Event Horizon,” accessed March 1, 2017, https://
medium.com/lemming-cliff.

21

PBS Newshour, “A New Generation of Human Rights Investigators Turns to High-tech Methods,” February 13, 2017,
accessed February 27, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDLtL8aWRAQ.

22

Sam Dubberley, “New Data and the Importance of Collaboration,” July 18, 2016, accessed July 28, 2016, https://
citizenevidence.org/2016/07/18/new-data-and-the-importance-of-collaboration/.

23

The City University of New York, Graduate School of Journalism, accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.journalism.cuny.
edu/academics/social-journalism/curriculum-and-courses/.

24

Karen Naimer, Widney Brown and Ranit Mishori, “MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Design,
Development, and Deployment of Mobile Technology to Document Forensic Evidence of Sexual Violence,” Genocide
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 25-35.

25

See, in detail, Nathaniel A. Raymond, Brittany L. Card, and Isaac L. Baker, “A New Forensics: Developing Standard
Remote Sensing Methodologies to Detect and Document Mass Atrocities,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal, Volume 8, Issue 3, (2013) Article 6.

26

American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Documentation of Petrochemical Release: Bodo, Nigeria,”
accessed July 26, 2016, http://www.aaas.org/page/documentation-petrochemical-release-bodo-nigeria.

27

Lars Bromley, “Relating Violence to MODIS Fire Detections in Darfur, Sudan,” International Journal of Remote Sensing, 31,
9 (2010), 2277-2202.
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Mobile phone technology has implications for gaining access to information and has led to
an explosion in open source information that human rights researchers can exploit. Open source
information includes publically accessible information such as news articles, academic articles,
statistics, and, increasingly, audiovisual content or reporting shared through online social
networks. This rapid growth of information is fed by smart phone technology and enabled by digital
networks. It is important to note that the audiovisual content by itself is nothing new. Prominent
human rights-relevant examples from the pre-digital age are the Rodney King video or the Zoran
Petrovic video of Srebrenica.28 Camera enabled cell phones, the digitization of content, and the
ongoing increase in internet penetration are the game changers. The result is that information is
distributed less through official media outlets, such as TV broadcasts and newspapers, and more
through online social networks in real-time. Thus, more than ever, reporting on human rights
abuses moves beyond the control of governments. The implications for researchers are profound,
similar to the advent of commercial remote sensing.
The following case studies and examples provide insights on how these technologies positively
impact human rights fact-finding.
Satellite Imagery
The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the kwanliso political
prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the
twentieth century. The institutions and officials involved are not held accountable. Impunity
reigns.29

The value of ICTs to address lack of information is most powerfully demonstrated in the use of
satellite imagery to document political prison camps in North Korea. Despite severe constraints, the
UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea was able to document serious violations of international
human rights law on a systematic level that suggest that North Korean authorities are committing
crimes against humanity.30 ICTs played a crucial role in contributing to the establishment of the
Commission and the collection of rare evidence used by the Commission.
North Korea is one of the world’s most reclusive and inaccessible countries. Human rights
researchers face the following problems when attempting to document the system of political
prison camps and associated human rights violations:
•
•
•

Human rights researchers do not have direct access to the country.
No other independent observers, such as international journalists or the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),31 have access to the political prison camps
Due to heavy restrictions on freedom of expression, there is no online or social media
content available of the camps. In fact, there appears to be only a single piece of audiovisual
content available of the political camps, which is a video by Japanese Fuji TV, reportedly
of Yodok camp.32

Human rights researchers thus have only two options to research camp conditions –by
interviewing the few people who were in one of the camps and fled the country, or by using remote
28

“Rodney King beating video, full length footage,” YouTube video, 8:08, March 3, 1991, accessed July 25, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sb1WywIpUtY; “Zoran Petrovic video,” YouTube video, 1:16, July 14, 1995,
accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=344e_D-Vc7g.

29

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “North Korea: UN Commission documents wide-ranging and
ongoing crimes against humanity, urges referral to ICC,” February 7, 2014, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E#sthash.ukBW9bLP.dpuf.

30

Ibid.

31

While the ICRC has a small presence in Pyongyang, it does not appear to have access to any political prison camps. See
ICRC, ”The ICRC in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/dprk-icrc-activities-leaflet.

32

Reuters, Video Shows Harsh Life in N. Korean Camp - Japan TV, February 27, 2004.
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sensing. Detention facilities lend themselves very well for remote observation, due to the fact that
the detention infrastructure is easy to detect and assess from afar. The rationale of using remote
sensing came from addressing some of the following uncertainties:
•

•
•

The very existence of the camps: North Korean officials deny the existence of political prison
camps. While denial is a standard strategy of perpetrators,33 in this case it is especially
difficult to counter authorities’ narrative due to an almost complete lack of information
about the camps. The dependence on an extremely limited number of eyewitness becomes
even more challenging when testimony appears to contain inaccuracies.34
The number of camps: There was some dispute about the exact number of political prisons
camps, due to reports of closures. Current reports estimate four active camps.
The number of prisoners: It remains unclear how large the size of the prison population is,
and current estimates list 80,000-120,000 people.35

In 2003, the US Committee on Human Rights North Korea (HRNK) published a seminal report
on the camp system.36 It was one of the first times a non-governmental organization deployed remote
sensing for human rights documentation, providing visual evidence of a vast system of political
prison camps. Amnesty International later used satellite to document the existence of the camps,
as well as apparent changes to the camps’ infrastructure. In 2013, during the run up to the vote at
the UN Human Rights Council that established the Commission of Inquiry, Amnesty International
released findings that suggest that authorities are expanding its detention infrastructure, by setting
up a new security zone adjacent to Camp 14.37 This determination was made by analyzing satellite
imagery that showed the construction of fences and controlled access points, which limited the
freedom of movement of people living within the newly created control zone.

Figure 1. © DigitalGlobe. February 7, 2013.
33

Edwards, Fieldwork from the Sky, 1-3.

34

Catherine E. Shoichet and Madison Park, “North Korean Prison Camp Survivor Admits Inaccuracies, author says,”
CNN, January 20, 2015, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/18/asia/north-korea-defector-changesstory/.

35

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “North Korea: UN Commission Documents Wide-ranging and
Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity.”

36

David Hawk, “The Hidden Gulag. Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps. Prisoners’ Testimonies and Satellite
Photographs,” US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, (2003), accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.hrnk.org/
uploads/pdfs/NKHiddenGulag_DavidHawk.pdf.

37

Amnesty International, “North Korea: New images show blurring of prison camps and villages,” March 7, 2013,
accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/03/north-korea-new-images-show-blurringprison-camps-and-villages/.
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A few months later, new satellite imagery analysis documented ongoing investment in the
camps’ infrastructure, such as new housing blocks and an expansion of production facilities38—
facts that were in direct contrast with ongoing North Korean authorities’ claims that the political
prison camps do not exist.
Satellite image analysis subsequently played a crucial role in the report of the Commission of
Inquiry, the most comprehensive record of the human rights situation in North Korea. The value
of the imagery analysis was highlighted by Chairman Michael Kirby during the presentation of the
report, and a separate appendix with only satellite images is a further sign of the importance of this
content to the investigation.39
In addition to documenting the very existence of the camps, thus establishing basic facts
in, details were derived from the imagery that addressed some of the other uncertainties. For
example, additional analysis from December 2013 determined the exact size of Camp 16, which
with 560 km2 is three times the size of Washington, D.C.40 Analysis by the HRNK and AllSource
Analysis pointedly captures how satellite imagery reduces information uncertainties in regards to
speculations on the creation of a new camp:
The Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is unique among North Korea’s network of [political prison
camps] in that its identification as a political detention facility is based upon the analysis of
satellite imagery, comparison of its infrastructure characteristics with other [political prison
camps] (e.g., security perimeter with entrance and guard positions, internal arrangement,
etc.), and its physical association with Camp 14—they share a common security perimeter
for approximately 3.1 kilometers.41

Looking forward, more could likely be done to gather additional human rights relevant facts:
For example, occasionally satellites capture construction in progress, as was the case in a 2013
satellite image of Camp 16. Such insights into the size of houses and rooms could be used to make
more precise estimations on the size of the prisoner populations. With the advent of satellite video,42
the potential capture of active vehicles and checkpoints could be indications of ongoing activities
in the camps, which might counteract claims to the contrary.
The use of satellite images in human rights documentation has become standard since HRNK’s
2003 report and too many examples exist to list in this article. However, two additional examples
are especially useful to demonstrate how satellite images are reducing information uncertainty.
In January 2015, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch released satellite images
of one of the deadliest Boko Haram attacks to date. The high-resolution images of the burned down
villages of Baga and Dora Baga in north-east Nigeria created massive media coverage, including
front page coverage in the New York Times.43 It is noteworthy that this coverage came approximately
two weeks after the actual attack happened. Only minimal information was available of the attack
and no journalists or human rights researchers could reach the affected area. This information
challenge was exacerbated by a lack of local communications infrastructure.
In Sri Lanka in 2009, satellite imagery allowed researchers to gain remote access to the
conflict affected area and provide human rights relevant documentation, such as the presence of
impact craters or the emergence of gravesites in the so-called Civilian Safety Zone. Additionally,
38

Amnesty International, “New satellite images show scale of North Korea’s repressive prison camps,” December 5, 2013,
accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/12/new-satellite-images-show-scale-northkorea-s-repressive-prison-camps/.

39

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “Satellite images of currently existing political prison camps
(kwanliso) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” January 28 2014, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.

40

Amnesty International, New satellite images show scale of North Korea’s repressive prison camps.

41

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Andy Dinville, and Mike Eley, “North Korea: Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area,” March 17, 2016,
accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/ASA_HRNK_Chmbg_201603_FINAL.pdf.

42

“Terra Bella,” Google, accessed March 17, 2017, https://terrabella.google.com/.

43
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Figure 2. © Digital Globe. May 26, 2013.

Figure 3. Graphic and analysis by AAAS, used with permission.
analysts at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) were able to draw
conclusions about the likely actor responsible for shelling, a fact that was repeatedly disputed
by the parties to the conflict.44 Analysis of craters, their ejecta patterns, and likely trajectories of
44

See, for example, an incident in January 2009: “The spokesman for the Sri Lankan military, Brig. V. U. B. Nanayakkara,
denied that government artillery had hit a United Nations compound, or a hospital compound. He said that either the
relief and hospital officials had been pressed by the rebels to disseminate false information, or that the Tamil Tigers
had been responsible for the shelling.” Quoted in Somini Senguptajan, “U.N. Staff and Hospital Come Under Shelling
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shells revealed that multiple impact craters stemmed from artillery positions of the Sri Lankan
army.45
Mobile Technology
In addition to Syria, the armed conflict in north-east Nigeria is a prime example that demonstrates
the impact camera enabled cell phones have on human rights fact-finding.
For two 2015 reports on violations by both Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces, Amnesty
International analyzed close to 100 videos in addition to multiple photographs. The footage—
stemming from eyewitnesses and likely perpetrators, captured mainly on cell phones and
shared via messaging apps or on social media, —played a crucial role in the research. The videos
predominantly showed human rights violations by Nigerian military forces and an associated
civilian militia, the so-called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). A noteworthy lemon that slipped
into this collection was a video of a likely homicide from outside the conflicted affected area.46
The videos captured multiple incidents related to the ongoing conflict. A single date—March
14, 2014—stood out both in terms of the severity and scale of violations and the amount of available
digital content. On that day, Boko Haram attacked Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, freeing
hundreds of detainees. In response to the attack and prison break, Nigerian security forces and
CJTF killed more than 600 men and boys, most of them recaptured detainees.47 Videographic
evidence played a leading role in the following investigation. Footage included a Nigerian soldier
executing an unarmed person in broad daylight who was lying on the ground. Two other videos
showed how security forces and CJTF forced captured young male adults to dig graves before
executing them by cutting their throats. (The same video showed up with claims that it originates
in the Central African Republic).48 While the location of this incident could not be independently
verified from the footage alone, Amnesty International researchers were able to receive the original
video files. This allowed analysts to confirm the incident date by reviewing the intact metadata
of the files (which is often not possible since the metadata is normally altered or removed when
files are shared through social media or mobile phone apps such as WhatsApp or Signal). Most
importantly, the footage presented strong evidence in terms of agency, which is crucial to identify
specific units or command responsibility. An inventory number visible on a rifle of a Nigerian
soldier suggests that it belonged to the Support Company of the 81 Battalion (and Amnesty
International researchers confirmed with sources within the military that this specific rifle has not
been reported stolen).49 Such findings might have political or legal implications. The International
Criminal Court is currently conducting a preliminary examination into the armed conflict in
north-east Nigeria. Additionally, national legislation, such as the Leahy Law in the United States,
prohibits military aid to foreign security forces that are implicated in serious violations of human
rights. It is precisely this sort of detail on unit involvement and command responsibility that has
serious implications on the vetting process of the Leahy Law.50
Another example comes from Bama, 70 km east of Maiduguri, where several individuals
recorded various incidents. Multiple videos showed how Boko Haram fighters in September 2014
took prisoners from Bama prison, tied them behind a truck, dragged them to a bridge, lined them up,
as Sri Lanka Fights Cornered Rebels,” New York Times, January 27, 2009, accessed July 28, 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/28/world/asia/28lanka.html?_r=0.
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Figure 4. Some colors inverted using VLC Player, for enhancement purposes only. Graphic produced by
author.
killed them, and threw their corpses in a river. Due to the clear geographic landmarks visible in the
video (prison and bridge), it was possible to confirm the exact locations and reconstruct the event.
More than a year earlier, the Nigerian military conducted a screening operation of hundreds
of men in the same town, after which 35 were arrested and later executed. Several, lengthy videos
allowed analysts to reconstruct the operation, identifying the exact location as 380 meters east of
Bama market. At one point, eyewitnesses were filming each other. Such multi-angle videos will
play an increasingly important role in human rights investigations, as they allow for detailed
crime scene reconstructions, especially when combined with satellite imagery, as is already
common in law enforcement investigations. Examples for such an approach are Situ Research’s,
Forensic Architecture’s and Human Rights Watch’s reconstruction of White Phosphorous attacks
on residential areas in Gaza in 2009,51 or Forensic Architecture’s and Amnesty International’s
investigation into the attack on Rafah on August 1, 2014.52
Describing the amount of human rights relevant photo and videographic evidence from
Syria goes beyond the scope of this article, but also raises important questions about archiving
and evidence handling. Jay Aronson in his contribution to this special issue provides an analysis
on preservation of human rights related video, in which he identifies two core tensions: first, the
purpose of preservation; and second, the control over the saved content. Many important questions
around consent, security, privacy, and ethics can be traced back to these two issues, as Jay Aronson
argues in his article published in this special issue.53 The Syria Justice and Accountability Center54,
51

“White Phosphorus Report,” Situ Research, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.situresearch.com/works/whitephosphorus-report.

52
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Jay Aronson, “Preserving Human Rights Media,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017):
82-99.
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2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205031.htm.
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as a newly created organization, has been tasked with this effort, among other responsibilities.
Automated analysis will play an increasingly important role in processing large datasets for human
rights research and event reconstruction. For example, Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for
Human Rights Science assisted with investigating the killing of protestors in Ukraine by processing
520 videos with a total length of 65 hours with an audio analysis and synchronization tool.55
To give a final example of the increasing evidentiary value of video, digital content is
playing an increasingly important role in assessing the legality or proportionality of airstrikes by
international forces. Videos of suspected Russian airstrikes have been used to identify specific
strike locations in residential areas, as analysts can use videos and photographs to geolocate specific
buildings that were destroyed by airstrikes. For example, 17 civilians, including three children,
were killed and at least 34 civilians were injured in September 2015 in Talbisseh, when suspected
Russian air strikes hit Karama Street in the center of the city.56 Similarly, multiple buildings in a
residential neighborhood in the immediate vicinity of a mosque were flattened in one of the first
US led coalition airstrikes, on Kafr Deryan, in September 2014. While this information alone does
not answer the question if this was a legitimate military target, the fact that videos show what
appear to be multiple civilian victims, including children,57 would suggest otherwise, and raises
questions for military commanders about violations of IHL. Additionally, Human Rights Watch
identified the missile remnants visible in a photograph circulated online as the turbofan engine of
a U.S. Tomahawk missile,58 tying the airstrikes in the area to US forces. This assessment is further
supported by YouTube videos released by the U.S. Navy showing the launch of cruise missiles on
the day of the attack.59
As the above examples have demonstrated, cell phones have become important tools to collect
and subsequently transmit digital audiovisual content that can provide important facts about the
date and location of an incident. However, they go beyond providing such basic facts and often
present crime base or linkage evidence, which reveal violations that would have gone otherwise
unnoticed, and in the best case scenario identify the responsible actor. Tapping into this potential
for reducing information uncertainty can provide the necessary facts and evidence to counter
perpetrator strategies of denial and minimization.
As the final case study will demonstrate in detail, combining satellite imagery with citizen
media can increasingly strengthen mass atrocity research.
The Convergence of ICTs to Lead Atrocity Research
There has been a notable shift since human rights groups started using remote sensing in the early
2000s as citizen media can gradually guide satellite imagery analysis. Such a tip and cue process
was not possible before the widespread proliferation of camera-enabled cell phones. Research into
suspected mass graves in Burundi provides a good case study of new ICT-led workflows in human
rights crisis research.
In December 2015, reports about mass graves emerged shortly after Burundian security forces
killed dozens of people on December 11, 2015. The killings included well-documented incidents
of extrajudicial killings with evidence of close range shots to the head of some victims and at least
55
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one body tied up. However, the question of what happened to the bodies remained unanswered
for several weeks after the incident. By January 2016, images started to appear on social media that
claimed to show mass graves.
A shaky cell phone video of a desolated area was shared with Amnesty International.
The short video did not reveal many reference points and ended with showing a small area of
disturbed earth. A slow motion review of the video allowed analysts to extract crucial details:
First, the video appeared to show five separate, small mounds. Second, the video included at
least some geographic reference points, most notably an abandoned building, grave stones, and
palm trees. Field and news reports suggested that one possible mass burial site was near Mpanda
cemetery, to the north of the capital Bujumbura. A review of pre-event satellite imagery on Google
Earth and other geographic databases eventually allowed pinpointing the exact location of the
likely gravesite. Equipped with this new information extracted from the video and Google Earth,
Amnesty International was able to commission analysis of new satellite imagery (Google Earth
imagery normally does not provide the most current imagery. In this case, the available imagery
was from prior to the event of interest).

Figure 5. © DigitalGlobe/Google Earth. November 3, 2015. Graphic produced by author.
The analysis of new satellite imagery provided further important details. A time series of
images showed that the area of disturbed earth emerged between 3 November and 22 December
2015. Another satellite image from early January 2016 showed light vegetation re-growth,
suggesting that the earth disturbance visible in the December image was likely very fresh, thus
being consistent with the eyewitness claims that it is a mass burial site containing bodies of some
of those killed on 11 December.
This case study describes the successful deployment of a combination of ICTs to detect a
likely mass atrocity crime and led to the publication of a briefing that would have been impossible
without the use of ICTs.60 Specifically, combining multiple technologies allowed the following:
60
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Gaining access to a restricted area: Both video and satellite imagery allowed to gain remote
access to a suspected mass grave site, which at that point was restricted to international,
independent fact-finders.
Determining the exact location: The video, despite being of low quality and lacking
any major landmarks or reference points, allowed establishing the exact location of the
suspected mass burial site.
Determining the time frame: Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed the exact
location of the site. Most importantly, however, the time series of satellite imagery allowed
establishing a time window within which the suspected grave site was created.

Finally, it is important to stress that ICTs, by themselves, did not reveal all details about this
incident. Both the video and satellite images showed disturbed earth at a specific location, created
in a specific time-window, but this did not necessarily prove the existence of a mass grave, nor
what was below the disturbed earth.61 Building on traditional research (eyewitnesses testimony),
however, this technology-enabled research helped build a strong case, which allowed calls for
accountability and further investigations, including physical access to the site to conduct forensic
analysis. Thus, the analysis strongly reduced the uncertainties surrounding multiple reports of
mass graves that were circulating for weeks in the aftermath of the extrajudicial executions.
Teaching the Next Generation
When teaching the next generation of human rights researchers, it is imperative to not solely
transfer technical skills. No matter which technology is used, at the core should be the responsible
use of data, which is defined as
[t]he duty to ensure people’s rights to consent, privacy, security and ownership around the
information processes of collection, analysis, storage, presentation and reuse of data, while
respecting the values of transparency and openness.62

Beyond this core guiding principle, different technologies create different risk scenarios,
which should be considered at the onset of any new research project. Especially the increase of
audiovisual materials through cell-phone cameras leads to datasets whose content often include
information that can be used to identify specific individuals, a challenge that will only be exacerbated
by the increased use of UAVs. In addition to the content, metadata that is invisible embedded in
photographs or videos can reveal sensitive information about a person.
Satellite imagery that reveals little to no information about specific individuals, however,
creates other risk factors. These include providing intelligence to a party to a conflict, or the public
dissemination of other sensitive information such as trapped civilians who are fleeing violence.
Only the responsible use of data (based on well-established professional standards) generated from
inherent surveillance technologies such as satellites and drones can solve the tension of its use by
human rights groups, who at the same time criticize the increase in government mass surveillance.
More and more resources exist that can be used in teaching on these topics. They include a
growing body of academic articles on remote sensing,63 in addition to more technical resources
61
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produced by universities.64 Initial in-depth writings have been published in the area of open source
research and verification65 and the use of mobile technology66, in addition to the sharing of best
practices, hands-on guides,67 case studies68 and ethics.69
What is still missing is the development of actual curricula on new methodologies in human
rights research, although first academic programs in this field are emerging.70 Additionally, large
human rights groups have developed multi-day trainings for both internal and external audiences
focusing exclusively on the ethical and impactful use of new technologies in human rights research.
Finally, there are increasing opportunities for students to gain practical experience in this
work, through, for example, the Syracuse University’s Syrian Accountability Project71 or the Digital
Verification Corps, a partnership between Amnesty International and the Universities of Berkeley,
Essex, Toronto and Pretoria.
Conclusion and Outlook
Due to the high level of information uncertainty during human rights crises, there is a very high
premium on fact-finding and the collection of reliable evidence. As this paper has shown, certain
ICTs can help achieve this goal and can contribute meaningfully to mass atrocities research by
reducing uncertainties. Often, this comes through the collection and transmission of highly
relevant details on specific violations, including crime base and linkage evidence. To be clear, the
technologies described here are most impactful if they are part of a holistic approach to crisis
research: integrated into traditional research and deployed to address specific information gaps,
instead of relying on a single technology or source.
There are a number of steps the human rights community can take to increase the efficiency
of its current use of ICTs. First, human rights organizations can provide more trainings to their
research staff. For example, Amnesty International has started to integrate geospatial and open
source research and verification into its core research methodology training. While this is an
important step, more can be done. Resources on methodology in these areas are still insufficient and
there are needs and opportunities that can be addressed outside the practitioners’ field. Academics
could contribute to the development of guidelines on the use of ICTs based on well-established and
proven human rights research methodologies. Funders can support projects that go beyond tool
development, such as grants for curricula development, in order to provide the next generation of
researchers with the appropriate coursework.
Finally, human rights groups largely work in silos when it comes to filtering out misinformation
from relevant content. While human rights crisis reporting increasingly builds on digital content
and technology enabled research, the misinformation that was encountered during the research
process largely remains on the computers or in the individual memory of a researcher. As a lot of
digital misinformation is recycled content that re-emerges during crises, knowledge sharing and
accessed September 15, 2016, http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/app/uploads/2015/01/Livingston_Final.pdf.
64

See, for example, “The Nature of Geographic Information. An Open Geospatial Textbook,” accessed September 15, 2015,
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/natureofgeoinfo/.

65

Koettl, Citizen Media Research and Verification.

66

Jay Aronson, “Mobile phones, social media and big data in human rights fact-finding. Possibilities, challenges, and
limitations,” in The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, eds. Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 441-461.

67

“Citizen Evidence Lab,” Amnesty International, accessed September 15, 2016, https://citizenevidence.org/.

68

Christoph Koettl: “Using UGC in human rights and war crimes investigations,” in Verification Handbook for investigative
reporting, ed. Craig Silverman, (Maastricht: EJC, 2015), Chapter 7, accessed September 15, 2015,
http://verificationhandbook.com/book2/chapter7.php.

69

On the topic of crowdsourcing, which has not been addressed in this article, see Martin Shields, “The Technologist’s
Dilemma. Ethical Challenges of Using Crowdsourcing Technology in Conflict and Disaster-Affected Regions,” in
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013), 157-163.

70

See, for example, the University of Essex’s focus on technology and human rights in its 2015 Summer School, accessed
September 15, 2016, https://www.essex.ac.uk/hrc/summerschool/default.aspx.

71

“Syria Accountability Project”, Syracuse University College of Law, accessed September 15, 2016,
http://syrianaccountabilityproject.org/.

©2017

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 1 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1440

Using ICTs to Reduce Information Uncertainty in Human Rights Research

51

the creation of community knowledge, in the form of a shared database, could further help address
the lemon problem.
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